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1. INTRODUCTION
This is an exciting time to be working to control corruption
in international business and development. I am honored to be
here to share with you news of recent successes and to enlist your
support in confronting the challenges which are still before us.
It is important to remember, in our discussion of the problems
confronting the legal and ethical foundations of emerging
economies, that they are not alone in facing the problem of
corruption or in seeking prescriptions. Indeed, the legal question
posed for this conference is whether corrupt activities by Western
business have to be addressed before corruption in emerging
economies can be curbed, and the parallel ethical question, what
moral obligation Western business owes the people in emerging
economies.
These questions could not be more timely nor the answers
more clear. The West must act, and recently it took an important
step forward. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"), whose members are home to most of
the major western multinationals, agreed to take action to end the
corrupt practices of their private sector in their dealings with
foreign public officials. They did so out of a growing recognition
that the cost of inaction is too great.
The cost of corruption is unacceptable, whether we are part of
the private/corporate sector with an understanding of the direct
cost of corruption and bribery on the bottom line, policy-makers
who understand that corruption undermines political stability and
the prospects for democracy, emerging economy leaders compet-
ing for investment capital which avoids risks inherent in corrup-
tion (or charges a premium because of them), or development
officials concerned with the corrosive effect of corruption on
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sustainable development in the countries where the needs are
greatest.
This confluence of interests in fighting corruption has
propelled the issue to the top of the political and economic agenda
and has underscored the need for cooperation and action by all
those affected - whether in the West or East, public or private
sector, free market or transition economy.
I will discuss why this age-old issue has recently gained new
prominence, describe some of the public- and private-sector
initiatives, and conclude with the important role of the private
sector in achieving implementation, compliance and effectiveness
of anticorruption programs.
2. A NEW PROMINENCE
Over the past few years, corruption has become, like human
rights and the environment in their time, a key issue of the
nineties. Daily newspaper stories detail corruption scandals in
virtually every country around the world: the United States,
Venezuela, India, Zaire, Korea, France, and even the Palestinian
Authority, to name but a few. The problem is universal and it is
no longer possible to consider it a problem that is confined to the
developing world or to a particular political or economic system.
Bribery and corruption's costs have also garnered recent
attention. Many used to believe that bribery was a fact of life
and, in some cases, the grease that made the wheels turn. Indeed,
this conference asks whether corruption should be condemned
only when it impedes economic development, regardless of its
efficiency. Most political scientists and economists working in the
field today would say that corruption always impedes economic
development; although, one might dispute the degree of hindrance
in those countries where there appears to be both economic
growth and rampant corruption.
Today, there is a widespread consensus that there is more at
stake than the amount of the bribe or the lost capital. Corruption
has the potential to undermine the dividends of the end of the
Cold War: (1) the consolidation of democracy, political stability,
and respect for the rule of law; (2) effective development; and (3)
the expansion of open, competitive markets.
Speaking of democracy in Latin America, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Jeffrey Davidow recently cautioned that, while
democracy is now more commonplace, in many cases it is weak
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or dysfunctional, and corrupt leaders and institutions can cause it
to fail.' This threat is also evident in the former Soviet Union,
much of Africa, and parts of Asia as well.
The problem is compounded in the developing world where
"long-term developmental goals .. .are impaired by the preva-
lence of corruption."2 The diversion of investment to foreign
bank accounts or to projects of negligible social value instead of
to much-needed projects, such as schools and hospitals, has a
disproportionate impact on the poor. Moreover, with weak
administrative and political institutions and generally low civil
service pay scales, corruption is more likely to become systemic.
In addition, public support for essential macroeconomic reforms
is jeopardized when corrupt officials ignore the rule of law in
favor of ad hoc special deals. Finally, corruption erodes political
support for development programs in the donor nations.
For those trying to do business globally, the problems are
equally unsettling. The magnitude of the bribe, rather than the
quality of the product or service, often determines major procure-
ment and infrastructure projects. On more routine matters,
corruption can make it difficult, if not impossible, for business to
operate. In Ecuador, hundreds of importers were affected by
corruption in customs, and corporations were reportedly charged
fifteen percent commissions by the tax authorities to obtain
refunds for overpayment.
For American business, which is subject to prohibitions against
bribery of foreign public officials under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act ("FCPA"),3 the demands of competing against
companies that are not subject to similar prohibitions is particular-
ly onerous. But even for those not currently subject to home
country laws prohibiting bribery, there is evidence that the
practice is no longer tenable because of the damage to corporate
reputation, risk of being debarred (as is the case in Singapore), and
unpredictability of the outcome. Moreover, the anomaly of
' See An Overview of U.S. Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (statement of Jeffrey Davidow, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs).
2 DANIEL KAUFMANN, HARVARD INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, LISTENING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SPELL THE
C .... WORD 3 (1996).
3 See 15 U.S.C. SS 78dd-1 to -2 (1994).
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prohibiting bribery of home country officials while making it
legal and even tax deductible to suborn foreign ones is untenable
and deeply resented in the developing world.
Even for companies operating under current permissive rules,
lack of transparency in laws and regulations and uncertainty about
the reliability and independence of the judicial system have made
doing business unpredictable, a risk that adds to costs and a
negative factor in investment decisions. Indeed, we now have
several excellent studies documenting what we learned from
experience - that corruption reduces inward foreign direct
investment and social spending.
4
3. AN EMERGING CONSENSUS FOR REFORM
Faced with these destructive consequences of corruption, few
still dismiss it as solely an ethical or cultural issue that precludes
interference from the outside, or as so pervasive that little can be
done. Leaders of governments and heads of international
organizations that formerly would not speak the "C-word" now
recognize that too much is at stake to accept the status quo of the
existing, inadequate regimes.
With the end of the Cold War, policy makers are less likely
to support corrupt leaders for other geopolitical objectives.
Success in the global marketplace has become a driving force in
foreign policy for both industrialized and emerging economies.
With the emergence of democracy, we are witnessing the growth
of a free press and investigative journalism as well as more open
political competition, more independent judiciaries and prosecu-
tors, and a coming of age of civil society as a political force
demanding accountability from those who govern.
4. CURRENT MULTILATERAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
INITIATIVES
In sum, international institutions, government officials, and the
private sector are beginning to mobilize to bring about broadbased
reform. They are also beginning to work together to bring
initiatives to fruition. Working together has been the hallmark of
Transparency International ("TI"), a coalition against corruption.
Since its founding in Germany in 1993, TI has (1) raised public
' See Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 QJ. ECON. 681 (1995).
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awareness, (2) mobilized civil society and the private sector to
work in coalition in over seventy countries as TI national
chapters,' and (3) worked with government and institutional
leaders on initiatives that would support systemic reform.
There has been a marked change in attitude since the 1970s,
when the U.S. government began pressing other governments to
enact laws prohibiting transnational bribery. While U.S. leader-
ship continues to be critical, others are now taking action out of
self-interest. Members of the OECD, European Union ("EU"),
and Organization of American States (OAS") have taken bold
steps. The United Nations ("UN"), World Bank, and Internation-
al Monetary Fund ("IMF"), are taking stock of their roles, and the
private sector, through such organizations as the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC") and TI, is moving forward as
well. I would like to talk about some of these organizations to
illustrate just how far we have come.
4.1. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
The first breakthrough came at the OECD, whose twenty-nine
members are home to most of the world's major multinational
corporations and whose laws, other than those of the United
States, have permitted bribery of foreign public officials and, in
many cases, tax deductions for such payments. On May 23, 1997,
the ministers agreed to negotiate a convention to make bribery of
foreign officials a crime in all twenty-nine OECD member states.
This decision culminates the original recommendation to take
"meaningful steps" to address bribery of foreign public officials in
May 1994. Since then, working groups have looked at criminaliz-
ation, tax deductibility, procurement, and accounting practices.
Agreement was reached on the "common elements" for
criminalization, as well as on a detailed timetable, under which (a)
a treaty in conformity with the common elements would be ready
for signature by the end of 1997, (b) the legislation would be
submitted to national legislatures by April 1, 1998, and (c) the
target date for entry into force would be the end of 1998.
s The U.S. chapter of Transparency International is a coalition of
professionals, academics, corporations, and journalists. Financial support is
received from over two dozen corporations, foundations, and development
assistance institutions.
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The agreement resolves a protracted impasse primarily between
French and German insistence on implementing criminalization
of foreign bribery through a treaty and the position of the United
States and most other member states favoring implementation
directly through national legislation. The agreed-upon timetable
overcomes concern that the treaty process would be used to delay
criminalization. The requirement that the treaty be in conformity
with the "common elements" addresses the concern that there be
adequate terms of reference.
The OECD will also establish a monitoring program, modeled
on the Financial Action Task Force, that covers money launder-
ing. This process adds frequent assessment by well-trained
individuals from several different states because self-reporting by
governments is not sufficient to assure effective and consistent
implementation of criminalization.
The monitoring will also cover implementation of the 1996
recommendation to end tax deductibility of foreign bribery. Only
a few countries have initiated the necessary legal changes for this
recommendation, while others are awaiting criminalization. Some
have erroneously interpreted the recommendation to mean ending
tax deductions only in cases where there have been criminal
convictions of bribery. This practice would effectively permit
almost all bribes to continue to be tax deductible. This cannot be
permitted.
The 1997 recommendations also include best practices for
accounting and auditing, as well as procurement. On a parallel
track, the OECD Development Assistance Committee recom-
mended that bilateral donors do more to ensure that their aid
programs contain strong anticorruption measures.
Transparency International has provided substantive input to
the OECD Secretariat and Working Group on Bribery and, along
with the ICC, promoted a public statement by fifteen European
business leaders calling for prompt action by the OECD and EU.
4.2. European Union
On May 21, 1997, the EU Commission adopted a Communi-
cation to the Council and Parliament on a Union Policy Against
Corruption. It will be sent to the Council of Ministers and
Parliament. It lays out a detailed program for action by the EU,
its fifteen member states, and the eleven states which have applied
for membership. The main points include:
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" Criminalization of bribery of officials of the EU and of
member states is called for by the end of 1998. This would
include a protocol applying to bribery affecting the financial
interests of the EU and a recent, much broader protocol,
eliminating the financial interests provision, neither of
which has yet gone into effect.
" The Commission proposes that criminalization of foreign
bribery outside the EU be pursued in cooperation with the
OECD and the Council of Europe.
" Tax deductibility of bribes is criticized and the EU is urged
to develop a concerted program to abolish tax deductibility.
" A variety of other measures are proposed including
strengthening of public procurement rules, criminalization
of private corruption, stronger anticorruption measures in
EU foreign aid programs, and improving accounting and
auditing requirements.
The Commission's policy statement incorporates many of the
ideas proposed in a TI Brussels submission and is a major step
forward. In the letter transmitting the Communication on an EU
policy against corruption to the Commission, Commissioner
Gradin commended TI for its contribution to the outcome.
4.3. Latin America
Contemporaneous with the OECD effort, Latin American
leaders launched a similar effort, placing the corruption issue on
the agenda of the Summit of the Americas in December 1994 in
Miami.
Only sixteen months later, the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption was concluded. It has been signed by twenty-
three states, including the United States, but language discrepan-
cies have delayed ratification. To date, only Argentina, Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela have
ratified the Convention.
The Convention obligates parties to enact and enforce
adequate laws against acts of corruption, and it strengthens
cooperation between countries on criminal investigations, judicial
assistance, and extradition. It also requires states to criminalize
transnational bribery and illicit enrichment. Illicit enrichment
only requires an unexplained increase in assets rather than proof
of receipt of a bribe. Consequently, the Convention lowers the
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burden of proof required to prosecute a government official
suspected of illicit acts.'
Finally, the Convention encourages a series of "preventive
measures," including improving procurement practices, corporate
books and recordkeeping practices, public ethics standards, and
disclosure of assets. Clearly, implementation of these provisions
will be key to determining the importance of the convention, and
there is an understandable cynicism in the region that, having
concluded the convention, nothing further will be done.
The OAS approved a Program for Cooperation in the Fight
Against Corruption on June 2, 1997, at the General Assembly
meetings in Lima, Peru. Questions of allocating sufficient
financial and human resources and political authority for those at
the OAS tasked with implementation must still be answered. The
Program calls for development of a strategy to promote ratifica-
tion. It also provides for drafting model laws on transnational
bribery and illicit enrichment and for promoting their implemen-
tation along with preventive measures.
The issue is also receiving attention in other parts of Latin
America. The Latin American Trade Ministers agreed at the
recent meeting at Belo Horizonte, Brazil to launch the Free Trade
Area of the Americas negotiations at the Summit of the Americas
in March 1998 in Santiago, Chile. The Business Forum, which
met prior to the Ministerial, has recommended that an agreement
be negotiated on transparency in procurement.7 The business
participants called for countries to guarantee transparency of
government procurement; provide potential competitors with
access to information on its purchasing system, existing laws and
procedures, and the size of government purchases; and establish a
mechanism for contesting and settling disputes.
Participants also called on countries to amend laws to permit
dispute settlement outside existing local legal systems, and to
6 This offense was an important tool in the successful Hong Kong effort
to reduce corruption. See JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT,
HARVARD UNiVERSITY, OVERCOMING POICE CORRUPTION IN HONG KONG:
CASE PROGRAM 6.
7 The Business Forum called for the simultaneous negotiation at the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"). While it is premature to seek global consensus
at the WTO for a broad anti-corruption requirement, at the December 1996
Ministerial in Singapore, ministers agreed to establish a working group to make
recommendations on the elements of an agreement on transparency in procure-
ment. Conclusion of an agreement should be achievable in the near term.
1172 [Vol. 18:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss4/2
CONTROLLING CORR UPTION
establish procedures to permit settlement by independent entities.
The business leaders also submitted recommendations to enhance
transparency and reduce illicit practices in Customs procedures.
4.4. The United Nations
In December 1996, under United States Secretary of State
Albright's leadership, the UN adopted the Declaration Against
Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions.
The Declaration, while not legally binding, reflects the growing
political consensus.
4.5. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund
The heads of the World Bank and IMF have provided
significant impetus to the emerging consensus, particularly since
the 1996 annual meetings, when World Bank President James
Wolfensohn spoke openly about the bank's commitment to fight
what he called the "cancer of corruption."8 At the same meeting,
IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus said fund officials
would consider it their duty to press for anticorruption reform in
borrowing countries.9 This is a remarkable shift from only a few
years earlier, when many in these institutions considered the issue
too political.
4.6. International Chamber of Commerce
The role of the private sector in anticorruption reform is
particularly significant. The ICC took up extortion and bribery
in international business transactions twenty years ago, recogniz-
ing that a comprehensive program was needed to attack corrup-
tion from both the supply side and the demand side. Its report,
issued in 1977, made detailed recommendations for action by
international agencies, national governments, and the business
community. The Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and
Bribery were to serve as a basis for corporate self-regulation.
A dispute over a proposal to establish a panel to investigate
allegations of infringement of the Rules of Conduct limited the
' IMF Chief Says World Economy on Safer Course, FIN. POST, Oct. 2, 1996,
at 14.
' See Paul Blustein, IMF, World Bank Target Third-World Bribery, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 1996, at D3.
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impact of the 1977 action. Last year, in response to a wave of
bribery scandals, the ICC established a new committee, with
representatives from over one dozen countries, including the
chairman of TI-USA, to develop new recommendations.
Under the chairmanship of Francois Vincke, General Counsel
of Petrofina, the Belgian oil company, the committee drafted the
Report on Extortion and Bribery and the Corporate Rules of
Conduct ("Rules"), which were adopted by the ICC's Executive
Board under the leadership of Maria Livanos Cattaui on March 26,
1996. The Report on Extortion and Bribery endorses the OECD
actions and the strong positions taken by the heads of the World
Bank and IMP. It calls for more transparent government
procurement procedures, including disclosure of agents' commis-
sions and requiring antibribery certifications by bidders. It also
urges governments to regulate the conditions under which
political contributions are made, including public recording and
reporting.
The Corporate Rules of Conduct prohibit extortion and bribery
for any purpose, not merely "to obtain or retain business," the
FCPA standard and the one provided for in the ICC's 1977 rules.
Thus, extortion and bribery in judicial proceedings, tax matters,
regulatory cases, and legislative proceedings are covered.
The prohibition bars kickbacks and other techniques, such as
subcontracts and consulting agreements, to channel payments to
government officials, their relatives or business associates.
Companies are also required to take steps to ensure that agents do
not pay bribes, and payments to agents must be for legitimate
services.
The financial provisions of the Rules prohibit the use of "off
the books" or secret accounts and call for the establishment of
independent systems of auditing to disclose any transactions that
contravene the rules. Boards of directors are to establish and
maintain proper systems of control, conduct periodic compliance
reviews, and take appropriate action where indicated. The Rules
provide that political contributions be only in accordance with
applicable law and that public disclosure requirements be respect-
ed.
Companies are asked to draw up their own codes, consistent
with the Rules, and to develop clear policies, guidelines, and
training programs for implementing and enforcing its provisions.
Employees are to be encouraged to report possible violations and
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must be reassured against retribution. Higher levels of manage-
ment should be involved.
An ICC Standing Committee, with additional representatives
from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, plans to work with ICC
national committees in over sixty countries to encourage member
companies to adopt the new rules and to work with the OECD,
WTO, and other international organizations.
The work of the ICC and other private sector groups can
make a critical contribution, complementing the public sector
reforms. Last year, TI-USA developed a Corporate Anti-
Corruption Program: Survey of Best Practices ("Survey") as a
contribution to the dialogue on what companies can do to control
corruption. It draws on two decades of experience with corporate
compliance of legal and ethical rules.
The Survey indicates that the codes of many of the over two
dozen corporate supporters that contributed to it go further than
legally required. It was in the interest of corporations, stockhold-
ers, and employees to resist corrupt means to obtain business.
The Survey found that bribery undermines the competitive
dynamic that is needed to spur innovation and cost reduction.
Because bribery requires secrecy and masking book entries, it
also interferes with managerial control. Management may have
difficulty learning the real reasons for expenditures and whether
some funds end up with intermediaries or the enterprise's own
employees. The potential for blackmail by an employee with
knowledge about corrupt payments could have a corrosive effect
on discipline within the organization.
Moreover, the double standard of paying bribes abroad but
competing honestly at home proved difficult to maintain.
European countries, for example, have discovered that bribery can
no longer be restricted to outside their borders. Mixed messages
were found to undermine the effectiveness of domestic anti-
corruption programs: slush funds reserved to obtain orders
abroad found their way into deals at home.
Perhaps the most expensive cost of tolerating corruption was,
and continues to be, the adverse effects of disclosure. In addition
to damage to reputation, significant loss of property or opportuni-
ty can be involved. For example, the government of Singapore
barred several German and Japanese companies from bidding on
public contracts because of allegations that they had bribed an
official. In short, the risks and the penalties have increased.
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The private sector must observe the highest standards.
Companies, however, fear being disadvantaged if everyone does
not subscribe to consistent antibribery rules. Recognizing this
dilemma, TI has developed an "islands of integrity" concept as an
interim device until criminalization is universal. Under an "island
of integrity," the rules are the same for all players. For example,
in a procurement project, the procurement agency and bidders
would certify to not permit bribery; would disclose all payments;
and would agree to sanctions for violations. The World Bank is
considering the use of such a device on bank-financed projects.
5. THE SYNERGY OF INTERACTING MEASURES
These public and private sector initiatives are not a panacea,
and laws alone will not change behavior. But they are the
building blocks for creating a new political reality.
Progress will not come easily. As the chairman of TI-USA has
observed, "[c]orrupt officials can make vastly more money by
taking bribes than by being honest. For corrupt companies,
paying bribes has been an easy and effective way to win orders.
Bribery has provided a way to beat competitors with better
technology and lower costs."10
Change has resulted from the combined efforts of all the
stakeholders in the industrialized and the developing nations, and
in the public and private sectors. All must remain involved if the
laws, conventions, and other reforms are to prove effective. We
must foster a continued change in attitude and take advantage of
this window of opportunity to achieve practical results.
10 Fritz F. Heimann, International Corruption and Corporate Codes of
Conduct, Presentation at Institute for International Economics Conference on
Corruption in the World Economy, Washington D.C. (Apr. 17, 1996).
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